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Abstract
This paper investigates the secret key authentication capacity region. Specifically, the focus is on a model where
a source must transmit information over an adversary controlled channel where the adversary, prior to the source’s
transmission, decides whether or not to replace the destination’s observation with an arbitrary one of their choosing
(done in hopes of having the destination accept a false message). To combat the adversary, the source and destination
share a secret key which they may use to guarantee authenticated communications. The secret key authentication
capacity region here is then defined as the region of jointly achievable message rate, authentication rate, and key
consumption rate (i.e., how many bits of secret key are needed).
This is the second of a two part study, with the studies separated by how the authentication rate is measured.
Here, the authentication rate is measured by the minimum of the maximum probability of false acceptance where
the minimization is over all highly probable subsets of observations at the adversary. That is, consider the maximum
probability of false authentication as a function of the adversary’s observation, and the adversary’s observation as a
random variable. The authentication rate is then measured as the smallest number for which the probability that the
maximum probability of false authentication is greater than said number is arbitrary small. This is termed typical
authentication, since it only needs to consider adversarial observations which are typical with the transmission. Under
this measure of authentication matching inner and outer bounds are determined. Not surprisingly, the region can be
expressed in terms of classical measures on the channel’s information. Of importance, the authentication rate region
expressed shows that there is a trade-off between message rate and authentication rate; more specifically, the two
must share the channel’s capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Authentication is inherently a physical layer problem; any protocol that labels data as valid or invalid naturally
creates a bifurcation of the physical layer observations. What’s more, this labeling should degrade the performance
of the communication system in comparison to a system which does not require authentication, since any possible
observation which is labeled as inauthentic can no longer contribute to the probability of reliably decoding. Our
goal with this series of papers is to generally explore these trade-offs. In particular, we wish to explore this trade-off
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2in a model previously considered by Lai et al. [1] and as a sub-case by Gungor and Koksal [2]. With this particular
model, information must be sent in the presence of an adversary. This adversary is particularly powerful in that it
can observe a noisy version of the transmitted data, and then arbitrarily decide the destination’s observation. On the
other end, the communicating parties are allowed to share a secret key prior to communications. For this model,
our goal is to derive a classical information theoretic “rate region” that describes the trade-off between message
rate, authentication rate, and the amount of secret key required (termed the key consumption rate).
This work has been split into two papers since, in the course of our efforts to obtain the desired rate region
characterization, we discovered that the traditional metric for authentication (the maximum probability of false
authentication) does not necessarily represent the true strength of the systems’ authentication capability. Indeed, the
traditional metric is beholden to extremely unlikely events occurring in the communication channel; for example,
a noisy binary symmetric channel acting as a noiseless channel. As a result, designing codes around the traditional
metric leads to codes which are designed with extremely unlikely cases in mind. Upon this discovery, we formulated
a new metric which only considers “typical” behaviour of the communication channel, with all other behavior being
written off as loss. With Part I, we explored this trade-off under the traditional metric. Here in Part II, we explore
this trade-off with our new metric and characterize the trade-off region. The need to split the papers based upon
choice of metric is done primarily to allow flexibility in how the results are presented, with the traditional metric’s
dependence on unlikely empirical channels dictating a notation where the various information theoretic terms are
functions of probability distributions, while the new metric allows for a (in our opinion) simpler presentation where
the information theoretic terms are functions of random variables. Additionally, while the focus for part I is on
achievability, here we must also focus on the converse.
Authentication is an important topic considered outside of the information theoretic literature. Some examples
include: Yu et al. [3] who used spread spectrum techniques in addition to a covert channel to ensure authentication,
Xiao et al. [4] who used the unique scattering of individual users in indoor environments to authenticate packets,
and Korzhik et al. [5] who make use of a (possibly noisy) initialization setup to create unique correlations which
then allow for detection. These methods, while perhaps more suitable for application, use tools that are insufficient
in determining the various information theoretic measures considered here. Instead, what they highlight is a concern
for authentication that should not be ignored. With this work, we hope to provide insight into the general problem,
and provide baselines to what is possible.
On the other hand, authentication has only somewhat been considered from the information theoretic viewpoint.
In particular, it can be argued that Blackwell et al. [6] and their study of the arbitrarily varying channel (AVC) was
the first true study of authentication. For the AVC, an adversary can at will choose the state of the communication
channel between the two communicating parties. This classic work and those that followed, such as [7], [8], [9],
all considered the maximum communication rate that can be obtained subject to an arbitrarily small probability of
error (over any choice of communication states by the adversary). Note, this indeed implies that a decoded message
would be authentic because the probability of error must take into account the adversaries actions. In this vein,
Ahlswede [10] considered the communication rate over an AVC when the source and destination share a secret key.
More specifically, Ahlswede gave the two communicating parties access to shared randomness, which must be kept
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3private from the adversary prior to transmission. For Ahlswede, allowing this secret key dramatically improved the
communication rate, essentially transforming AVCs into a compound channel.
While these papers do examine an aspect of authentication, one can also argue that they are much too strict
in their operational requirement. Today, the detection of the adversaries involvement is a strong enough result for
many fields of security; for example, in quantum key distribution a system is considered operational even though
the adversary can reduce the key rate to zero by measuring the data. In our case, it makes even more practical sense
to forgo such a harsh operational requirement. That is, if an adversary wanted to reduce the communication rate to
zero between two parties in practice, they would simply need a strong enough jammer. Of course, simply jamming
a signal is different than trying to have a node accept a fabricated message as authentic. This is the stance we adopt
here: when the adversary is attacking, a system is operational if it can decode the correct message or detect the
attack; when the adversary is not attacking, we want the system to communicate as much data as possible.
Adopting this viewpoint, works by Jiang [11], [12], Graves et al. [13], Kosut and Kliewer [14], and Beemer et
al. [15] all consider authentication over an AVC without a secret key. In particular, Jiang considered the sub-case
of AVC where the output of the AVC was independent of the legitimate parties input for all but a single channel
state. Graves et al. considered a general AVC where the adversary is given the side information of which message
is being transmitted, while Kosut and Kliewer considered the general AVC case. Finally, Beemer et al. considered
a binary AVC, where the adversary is allowed to observe the source’s transmission through a noisy channel before
choosing the channel state. Each of these works avoids looking at the strength of the authentication capability, and
instead only considers the data rate given the maximum probability of false authentication goes to zero.
Works considering secret key-based authentication have their genesis in Simmons [16], who considered a special
case of the model presented here where all channels are noiseless. The fundamental distinction separating the
problems of keyless and secret key authentication is that the former relies on exploiting nature of the communication
channels, while the latter relies on exploiting a finite resource. Later came the works of Lai et al. [1] and that of
Gungor and Koksal [2], who both consider generalizations of Simmons’ model with noisy channels. Each of these
works has aspects which could be strengthened. Lai et al. require the amount of secret key bits to be asymptotically
negligible when compared with the blocklength of the transmission. In doing so, though, they can make no distinction
in the importance of verifying ten versus ten thousand bits of data. Meanwhile, Gungor and Koksal’s coding scheme
is inefficient and mismanages the key by unnecessarily using it in a way that favors the adversary. Furthermore,
their work does not attempt1 to explicitly derive such a region, instead opting for a presentation of error exponents.
Once again, for this paper, we look to characterize the trade-off between information rate, strength of authenti-
cation, and the amount of required key. In this setting, with our new typical authentication rate metric, we are able
to derive a matching inner and outer bound, thus completely characterizing the region. For the inner bound, we
will use a coding scheme similar to that of Part I. On the other hand, for the converse, we use results from Graves
and Wong [17] which allow us to directly turn the operational requirement of authenticity into bounds on mutual
1Although we did endeavour to extract such a rate region from their works, we were unable to do so and instead had to settle for an outer
bound. Regardless, our results improve on an outer bound to their inner bound. See Part 1 of these works.
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4information terms.
We conclude this introduction by presenting the notation that will be used throughout the paper in Section I-A.
Following this, we shall present the exact channel model, and its relevant definitions in Section II. Section III,
then, revisits past work on this model, describing the works of [1], [16], and [17] in more detail as we believe
understanding the past schemes will allow for a better understanding of our approach. We will also describe the
results of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [18] on the discrete memoryless broadcast channel with confidential communications,
which will provide the basis for our direct scheme. Fundamental results are then presented in Section IV, and
examples of given in Section V. Proofs can be found in appendices.
A. Notation
Uppercase letters will be used to denote random variables (RVs) and lowercase letters will be used to denote
constants. The probability of event A is denoted Pr(A). Function p with subscript RV will be used to denote the
probability distribution over the RV (i.e., pX(x) = Pr(X = x)). To simplify presentation, the subscript may be
suppressed when clear. Calligraphic font or curly brackets will be used to denote sets, for instance Y = {1, . . . , 10}.
The only exceptions to this are the set of positive real numbers, denoted R+, and the set of positive integers, denoted
Z+. Subscripts will generally be used for bookkeeping purposes. While | denotes the word “given,” and : “subject
to.”
The function × will be used to denote the Cartesian product. We will frequently need to use the Cartesian product
of n (where n will denote the block length of a given code) correlated RVs, constants, and sets. This need arises so
frequently that we denote these Cartesian products by bold face. For instance, X = ×ni=1Xi = (X1, . . . , Xn) and
X = ×ni=1X . When using this notation with a probability distribution the terms in the product are uncorrelated.
For example, given a probability distribution pX over X
pX(x) =
n∏
i=1
pX(xi)
for each x ∈ X .
The indicator function of an event A is denoted 1 {A}, that is 1 {A} = 1 if A occurs, otherwise 1 {A} = 0.
The set of all probability distributions on a certain set, say X , is denoted by P(X ), likewise P(Y|X ) denotes
the probability distributions of Y conditioned on elements of X . The set P(Y  X ) represents a special subset of
P(Y|X ), where for each v ∈ P(Y  X ) and y ∈ Y there exists at most one x ∈ X such that v(y|x) > 0. Note,
for random variables X,Y, Z, if pY |X ∈ P(Y  X ), then X, Y, Z form a Markov chain, X c Y c Z.
Another special subset of the distributions is the possible “empirical distributions” (or type classes) for a given
n-length sequence, denoted Pn(·). The empirical distribution of sequence x, denoted px, is the distribution defined
by the proportion of occurrences of x in sequence x. In other words,
px(b) ,
∑n
i=1 1 {xi = b}
n
, ∀b ∈ X .
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5This follows similarly for empirical conditional distributions, but we further list the empirical distribution of the
conditioning value, such as Pn(Y|X ; ρ) for ρ ∈ Pn(X ). Here, the empirical conditional distribution of y given x
is defined by
py|x(b|a) ,
∑n
i=1 1 {yi = b} 1 {xi = a}∑n
i=1 1 {xi = a}
, ∀a× b ∈ X × Y.
For each µ ∈ Pn(Y|X ; ρ) and ρ ∈ Pn(X ), the type class of µ given a x such that px = ρ is denoted
Tµ(x) ,
{
y : py|x = µ
}
.
Black board bold (other than the two exceptions discussed earlier) is used to denote functions which are averaged
over RVs. Of particular importance is E which denotes the expectation operator. Other important functions are
entropy and mutual information denoted (respectively) by
H(Y |X) = −
∑
y∈Y,
x∈X
p(y, x) log2 p(y, x),
I(Y ;X|U) =
∑
y∈Y,
x∈X ,
u∈U
p(y, x, u) log2
p(y, x|u)
p(y|u)p(x|u)
= H(Y |U) +H(X|U)−H(X,Y |U),
for discrete random variables X , Y , and U .
In addition to the traditional absolute value, for any a ∈ Z, a ∈ Rn, and set A ⊆ X define the following:
|a| =
n∑
i=1
|ai|
|a|+ = a1 {a > 0}
|a|− = a1 {a < 0}
|A| =
∑
x∈X
1 {x ∈ A} .
Finally, the O function from the Bachmann-Landau notation will be employed here. That is, by writing g(x, n) =
f(x,O(h(n))), we are saying that there exists a constant such ζ, independent of n, such that
|g(x)| ≤ max
r∈[−ζh(n),ζh(n)]
f(x, r).
II. MODEL
In this communication model (pictured in Figure 1), Alice wishes to send a message M , uniformly distributed on
M = {1, . . . , 2nr} with n ∈ Z+ and r ∈ R+, to Bob over a (to be defined later) discrete memoryless-adversarial
interlope channel(pY |X , pZ|X) (DM-AIC(pY |X , pZ|X)). The DM-AIC(pY |X , pZ|X) is a channel controlled by
Grı´ma2, whose objective is to get Bob to accept a false message. To assist Alice and Bob, prior to the communication,
2Chosen for Grı´ma Wormtongue from Lord of the Rings by J.R.R. Tolkien. Grı´ma was an advisor to the King of Rohan, while secretly an
agent of Saruman. Thus his role was to listen to information presented to the King and manipulate it towards Saruman’s agenda. This seemed
more appropriate than “Eve,” since the adversary does not only take the role of eavesdropper.
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Fig. 1. Channel model where Grı´ma has chosen to interlope.
Alice and Bob share a secret key, K, chosen uniformly over K , {1, . . . , 2nκ}, where κ ∈ R+. For simplicity, we
assume that 2nr ∈ Z+ and 2nκ ∈ Z+. To transmit this message, Alice uses an encoder that selects an n-symbol
channel input sequence X as a (possibly stochastic) function of the message M and key K. Throughout this paper,
f ∈ P(X |M,K) will be used to denote the stochastic relationship between the encoder’s channel input sequence
given the message and secret key.
On the other end, Bob uses a decoder to estimate the message as a function of the channel’s output sequence,
either Y or Yˆ, and the shared key. The “!” symbol is to be representative of the decoder declaring their observation
is inauthentic. Similar to the encoder, the decoder will be identified by a conditional probability distribution ϕ ∈
P(M∪ {!}|Y ,K).
We now return to the discrete memoryless-adversarial interlope channel(pY |X , pZ|X). If Grı´ma chooses his own
sequence for the channel to output, it will be called interloping, and Yˆ will denote the channel’s output sequence.
When interloping, Grı´ma may arbitrarily choose the value of Yˆ as a function of his own observation Z, where the
probability that Z = z|{X = x} is pZ|X(z|x) =
∏n
i=1 pZ|X(zi|xi). Thus, when Grı´ma interlopes, we shall make
the assumption that the probability Yˆ = yˆ|{Z = z} is ψ(y|z) for some ψ ∈ P(Y |Z). In general, it should be
assumed that ψ ∈ P(Y |Z) will be chosen to minimize the authentication measure (to be discussed more later). On
the other hand, when Grı´ma does not interlope, Y will denote the channel’s output sequence, where specifically the
probability that Yˆ = y|{X = x} is pY |X(y|x) =
∏n
i=1 pY |X(yi|xi). Note this channel is not a true memoryless
channel since Grı´ma does not need to act in a memoryless fashion on the symbols. Instead, the pY |X and pZ|X
in a DM-AIC(pY |X , pZ|X) only specify the memoryless channels that connect Alice to Bob (if Grı´ma does not
interlope) and Alice to Grı´ma, respectively.
A. Operational Definitions
For this part of the study, we adopt the typical authentication rate, for a given authentication failure tolerance.
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7Definition 1. A code (f, ϕ) has typical authentication rate α and authentication failure tolerance  if
sup
{
a ∈ R+ : sup
ψ∈P(Y|Z)
Pr
(−n−1 log2 ωf,ϕ(Z,M,K) < a) ≤ 
}
≤ α
where
ωf,ϕ(z,m, k) ,
∑
y
ψ(y|z)
∑
m′∈M−{m}
ϕ(m′|y, k).
Recall from Part I of this study, ωf,ϕ(z,m, k) can be interpreted as the probability of false authentication given
Grı´ma observed z, the true message is m, and the key is k. In that sense, a code with a typical authentication rate
of α with an authentication failure tolerance of  guarantees that, with probability at least 1− , Grı´ma’s observed
sequence only provides Grı´ma with a 2−nα probability to fool Bob into authentication. In comparison, average
authentication is the probability of false authentication, averaged over all possible observations by Grı´ma. Thus,
the typical authentication rate is a measure of Grı´ma’s ability to falsely inject a message, as long as the channel
behaves as expected.
Moreover, the authentication failure tolerance acts as a measure of channel deviation in the same way as the final
operational definition, the probability of message error.
Definition 2. The probability of message error is
εf,ϕ , E [εf,ϕ(M,K)]
where
εf,ϕ(m, k) , E [1− ϕ(m|Y, k)]
= 1−
∑
x,y
ϕ(m|y,k)pY |X(y|x)f(x|m, k).
Remark Neither the authentication failure tolerance or the probability of message error is measured per transmitted
symbol.
Combining these operational parameters, we define the following code measure.
Definition 3. Code (f, ϕ) is a (r, α, κ, δ, n)-typical authentication (TA) code for DM-AIC(pY |X , pZ|X) if it has
blocklength n, message rate at least r, typical authentication rate at least α, key consumption rate at most κ, and
both probability of message error and authentication failure tolerance less than δ.
The goal of this work is to determine the inherent trade-offs between the message rate, authentication rate, and
key consumption rate, when the probability of message error and authentication failure tolerance go to zero. Note
that requiring the authentication failure tolerance go to zero yields codes for which almost surely the probability of
false authentication will have an upper bound of exp(−(n) authentication rate). As with the average authentication
capacity region, the typical authentication capacity region is defined as a limit point of the operational measures as
the blocklength goes to infinity.
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8Definition 4. A triple (r, α, κ) ∈ CTA(pY |X , pZ|X) if r > 0 and for each i ∈ Z+ there exists a (ri, αi, κi, δ, i)-TA
code for DM-AIC(pY |X , pZ|X) where
lim
i→∞
|(ri, αi, κi, δi)− (r, α, κ, 0)| = 0.
The set CTA(pY |X , pZ|X) is called the typical authentication capacity region.
Remark This region is, once again, closed (but not necessarily convex) by definition.
Remark The values of r = 0 are excluded from this region, since these codes transmit asymptotically 0 information
per symbol. Furthermore, eliminating the case where r = 0 yields a CTA(pY |X , pZ|X) that is convex. If, instead,
we were to allow r = 0, then the new value CTA(pY |X , pZ|X) would simply be the union of the region presented in
our results, and the set of (0, a, b) for all non-negative real numbers a and b. Indeed, consider the case where there
is only a single message to transmit. In this case it would be impossible for Grı´ma to replace it with an alternative,
and thus provide an infinite authentication rate, without consuming any key. Therefore, the case of r = 0 is not
really interesting in our context.
III. BACKGROUND
For the reader’s convenience, we shall briefly describe the coding schemes of Lai et al. [1] and Simmons [16].
While our coding scheme is novel in the sense that it has not previously appeared, it does share a design philosophy
with Lai et al. and with Simmons. These schemes separate in an intuitive way, with Lai et al.’s scheme exploiting
the channel for authenticity and Simmon’s scheme exploiting only the secret key for authenticity. In addition to
these coding schemes, it will be helpful to further discuss codes for the discrete broadcast channel with confidential
communications (DM-BCCC), from [19, Theorem 17.13]. Codes for the DM-BCCC will act as a base code to with
which we can use Lai’s strategy (although not his direct coding scheme).
For the converse, it will be helpful to briefly discuss information stabilizing random variables, introduced by
Graves and Wong [17]. These constructed random variables will provide us with a method by which to turn the
operational requirements for authentication into requirements on information terms similar to how Fano’s inequality
turns the requirement for a small probability of error into a requirement on a conditional entropy.
A. Lai’s Strategy
Lai et al. [1] used the strategy of having Alice explicitly send the value of the secret key to Bob, while
simultaneously obfuscating this value from Grı´ma. Since it will be of direct use here, we explicitly define Lai’s
strategy as follows.
Definition 5. A code (f, ϕ) uses Lai’s strategy if:
• for each y ∈ Y there is at most one value of k ∈ K such that ϕ(M|y, k) > 0,
• I(Z;K) ≤ .
With this strategy, each of Bob’s possible observed sequence can only correspond to a single key. Hence, any
attempt to interlope would require Grı´ma to select an observation corresponding to the secret key shared between
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9Alice and Bob. To that end, by Alice transmitting the value of the secret key in a way which obfuscates its value
from Grı´ma, she ensures that Grı´ma’s probability of determining which secret key is being used remains small.
For the specific code, Lai et al. [1] used a modified wiretap coding scheme where, in particular, they first chose
an integer n and distribution ρ ∈ Pn(X ) such that for X ∼ ρ(x)
I(Y ;X)− I(Z;X) > 0,
|M||K| < 2nI(Y ;X),
and |K| < 2n[I(Y ;X)−I(Z;X)].
Next, they randomly and independently selected approximately 2nI(Y ;X) codewords from the type set of Tρ. These
codewords were then placed into one of 2n[I(Y ;X)−I(Z;X)] bins at random, giving approximately 2nI(Z;X) codewords
per bin. Each of these bins were then associated with a particular key, and each codeword in the bin was assigned a
message. Because the capacity of the channel from Alice to Grı´ma was entirely exhausted sending the information
about the message given the secret key, the secret key remained obscured from Grı´ma and yet still correlated with
the message.
While one of our coding schemes will rely on Lai’s strategy, as stated in Definition 5, we will not limit ourselves
to their their coding scheme. Instead, we shall use a general code for the DM-BCCC which we describe in greater
detail in Section III-C.
B. Simmons’ strategy
Simmons [16] considered this problem where all channels were noiseless. Simmons’ strategy, specifically, was
to associate each key k ∈ {1, . . . , 2nκ} with an independently and randomly chosen subset X (k) ⊂ X where
|X (k)| = 2−nκ/2|X | = |M|.
For each m ∈M and k, Alice chooses a unique x ∈ X (k) to represent the message. Hence, the message rate is
n−1 log2 |M| = n−1 log2 |X˜ | − κ/2.
On the other hand, consider the scenario where Grı´ma observes x and replaces it with x′ 6= x. Having observed
x, Grı´ma can narrow down the value of the key (since not all X (k) contain x) and use this information in the
selection of x′. On average, there should be |K| (|X (k)| / |X |)2 = 1 value of k such that X (k) contain both x and
x′. At the same time, there will be on average |K| (|X (k)| / |X |) = 2nκ/2 values of k such that X (k) contains x.
Hence, on average Grı´ma should only have a 2−nκ/2 chance of selecting a x′ which is actually valid for the given
secret key.
C. Broadcast channel with confidential communications
Optimal codes for the DM-BCC(pY |X , pZ|X) channel were first determined by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [18], and
later improved by the same authors [19, Chapter 17]. We describe what appears in [19, Chapter 17]. Formally, a
DM-BCCC(pY |X , pZ|X) is similar to a DM-AIC(pY |X , pZ|X) where Grı´ma is forced to select Alice’s transmission.
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That is, Alice’s transmits sequence X, and Bob receives sequence Y, where Y|{X = x} ∼ pY |X(y|x), while
Grı´ma receives sequence Z, where Z|{X = x} ∼ pZ|X(z|x).
For the DM-BCCC(pY |X , pZ|X), though, Alice is attempting to send three different messages (M0,M1,Ms),
each with unique requirements. To wit, message M0 will need to be reliably decoded by both Bob and Grı´ma,
message M1 reliably decoded by only Bob, and message Ms reliably decoded by Bob but also kept secret from
Grı´ma. Our direct results will show codes of this type, when used with Lai’s strategy, naturally provide good
authentication codes. Because of this, the following more formal definition3 will be of use.
Definition 6. A code
(f˜ , ϕ˜, ϕˆ) ∈ (P(X |M0,M1,Ms),P(M0,M1,Ms|Y),P(M0|Z))
is a (r0, r1, rs, , n) code for the DM-BCCC(pY |X , pZ|X) if the following are satisfied
• |M0| ≥ 2nr0 , |M1| ≥ 2nr1 , |Ms| ≥ 2nrs ,
• ϕ˜(m0,m1,ms|y) ∈ {0, 1} for each (m0,m1,ms,y) ∈ (M0,M1,Ms,Y),
•
E [ϕ˜(M0,M1,Ms|Y)] ≥ 1− ,
•
E [ϕˆ(M0|Z)] ≥ 1− ,
•
I(Ms;Z) ≤ .
Definition 7. A triple of positive real numbers (r0, r1, rs) is achievable for the DM-BCCC(pY |X , pZ|X) if there
exists a sequence of (ai, bi, ci, i, i)-codes, for i ∈ Z+, such that
lim
i→∞
|(ai, bi, ci, i)− (r0, r1, rs, 0)| = 0.
Under these definitions, Csisza´r and Ko¨rner proved the following theorem [19, Theorem 17.13].
Theorem 8. ([19, Theorem 17.13]) The triple (r0, r1, rs) is achievable if and only if
r0 + rs + r1 ≤ I(Y ;U |W ) + min (I(Y ;W ), I(Z;W ))
rs ≤ I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z;U |W )
r0 ≤ min (I(Y,W ), I(Z;W )) ,
for some RVs U and W such that |U| ≤ (|X |+ 1)(|X |+ 3), |W| ≤ |X |+ 3, and W c U c X c (Y,Z).
3Csisza´r and Ko¨rner leave the formal definition up to the reader. These formal error definitions can be directly inferred from their code
construction, which relies on [19, Lemma 17.14], while the deterministic decoder requirement and leakage requirement are easily inferred as
consequences of [19, Theorem 17.13] being an extension of a simpler problem whose requirements are defined in [19, Definition 17.10].
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As will be shown later, a code for the DM-BCCC(pY |X , pZ|X), where K is transmitted using Ms and M is
transmitted using M1 naturally provides a coding scheme which satisfies Lai’s strategy (see Definition 5). By having
Alice send the secret key with the secret message, Bob can decode the transmitted value and check against his own
copy of the secret key to determine validity. At the same time, Grı´ma will not be able to gain much information
about the secret key since Ms is designed to be secret. Thus, Grı´ma’s probability of intruding in the system should
be around 2−nκ since he gained no information about the key, and at the same time each of Bob’s observations,
which Grı´ma may choose, correspond to only a single key.
To conclude this section, we simplify the region in Theorem 8 for triples of the form (0, r1, rs). Such a step is
prudent since, for our purposes, there is nothing to be gained by designing our coding scheme around transmission
of a message that Grı´ma can decode.
Corollary 9. The triple (0, r1, rs) is achievable if and only if
rs + r1 ≤ I(Y ;U,W )
rs ≤ I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z;U |W )
for some RVs U and W such that |U| ≤ (|X |+ 1)(|X |+ 3), |W| ≤ |X |+ 3, and W c U c X c (Y,Z).
Proof: First note that (0, r1, rs) is achievable if and only if (r1, rs) ∈ R, where R is the set of (r1, rs) for
which
rs + r1 ≤ I(Y ;U |W ) + min (I(Y ;W ), I(Z;W ))
rs ≤ I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z;U |W )
for some U and W such that |U| ≤ (|X |+1)(|X |+3), |W| ≤ |X |+3, and W c U c X c (Y,Z), by Theorem 8.
To prove the corollary, we must demonstrate that R = R′, where R′ is the set of (r1, rs) such that
rs + r1 ≤ I(Y ;U,W )
rs ≤ I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z;U |W )
for some U and W such that |U| ≤ (|X |+ 1)(|X |+ 3), |W| ≤ |X |+ 3, and W c U c X c (Y,Z).
To this end, it is clear that R ⊆ R′ since min (I(Y ;W ), I(Z;W )) ≤ I(Y ;W ).
Now to show R′ ⊆ R, let (r1, rs) ∈ R′ and further let U and W be the RVs guaranteed to exist via (r1, rs)
being a point in R′. If I(Y ;W ) ≤ I(Z;W ), then clearly (r1, rs) ∈ R. On the other hand if I(Y ;W ) > I(Z;W )
then setting Uˆ = U and Wˆ = ∅ provides
I(Y ; Uˆ |Wˆ ) + min
(
I(Y ; Wˆ ), I(Z; Wˆ )
)
= I(Y ;U)
= I(Y ;U,W )
≥ r1 + rs
I(Y ; Uˆ |Wˆ )− I(Z; Uˆ |Wˆ ) = I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U)
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= I(Y ;U,W )− I(Z;U,W )
= I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z;U |W ) + I(Y ;W )− I(Z;W )
> I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z;U |W )
≥ rs.
Furthermore |Uˆ | = |U| ≤ (|X |+1)(|X |+3), |Wˆ| = 0 ≤ |X |+3, and Wˆ c Uˆ c X c (Y, Z), hence (r1, rs) ∈ R.
D. Information stabilizing random variables
Converse proofs will rely heavily on [17, Corollary 17]. This result is hard to parse due to it’s generality, so for
presentation purposes, we specialize to the model at hand and have made all error terms equal.
Theorem 10. ([17, Corollary 17]) For each code and pair of discrete memoryless channels (pY |X , pZ|X), there
exists RV T such that:
•
n−1 log2 |T | ≤ λn, (1)
•
(T,M,K) c X c (Y,Z), (2)
•
Pr
(
(Y,Z,M,K, T ) ∈ D+) ≥ 1− 2−nλn , (3)
where λn = O(n
− 1
2|X|max(|Y|,|Z|)+2 log2 n) and D+ is the set of (y, z,m, k, t) such that
p(y|t) = 2−H(Y|T=t)+nλn
p(z|t) = 2−H(Z|T=t)+nλn
p(y|m, t) = 2−H(Y|M,T=t)+nλn
p(z|m, t) = 2−H(Z|M,T=t)+nλn
p(y|k, t) = 2−H(Y|K,T=t)+nλn
p(z|k, t) = 2−H(Z|K,T=t)+nλn
p(y|m, k, t) = 2−H(Y|M,K,T=t)+nλn
p(z|m, k, t) = 2−H(Z|M,K,T=t)+nλn
p(m|t) = 2−nr+nλn
p(k|t) = 2−nκ+nλn
p(m, k|t) = 2−n(r+κ)+nλn .
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Remark Furthermore, we will write statements of the form (y,m, k, t) ∈ D+ in lieu of defining a new set, say
D˜+, that consists of all (y,m, k, t) such that
p(y|t) = 2−H(Y|T=t)+nλn
p(y|m, t) = 2−H(Y|M,T=t)+nλn
p(y|k, t) = 2−H(Y|K,T=t)+nλn
p(y|m, k, t) = 2−H(Y|M,K,T=t)+nλn
p(m|t) = 2−nr+nλn
p(k|t) = 2−nκ+nλn
p(m, k|t) = 2−n(r+κ)+nλn .
To this end, if we were to define D˜+ as above then
Pr
(
(Y,M,K, T ) ∈ D˜+
)
≥ Pr ((Y,Z,M,K, T ) ∈ D+) ≥ 1− 2−nλn ,
since if there exists a z such that (y, z,m, k, t) ∈ D+, then (y,m, k, t) ∈ D˜+. Defining a new stabilizing set, such
as D˜+ above, would require us introduce notation for each of the 15 possible non empty substring of (y, z,m, k, t)
that include t (i.e., (y, z,m, t), (y, z, k, t), and so on). Instead, we emphasize the recursive nature of this result
here, and opt for using a single D+, considering it the stabilized set.
These properties will be useful in constructing information theoretic necessary conditions from authentication,
acting as a general Fano’s inequality. That is, where Fano’s inequality uses the probability of error to derive a
bound on conditional entropy, these properties will allow us to establish requirements on associated information
terms using the systems requirements for authentication. To give an example of how these properties may be used,
we conclude this section by demonstrating how to derive
r ≤ max
t
1
n
I(Y;M |T = t) + λ˜n, (4)
where λ˜n = 3λn − 1n log2(1− − 2−nλn), for any code that satisfies
1−  ≤
∑
y,m,k
p(y,m, k)ϕ(m|y, k).
From Equation (4) it can be further shown that
r ≤ max
pX
I(Y ;X) + λ˜n (5)
by using the chain rule for mutual information, and that conditional entropy is always strictly less than the
unconditional entropy, and then making use of since (T,M) c X c (Y,Z). Equation (5), where the error term
is replaced with one linearly dependent upon probability of error , can easily be derived starting from Fano’s
inequality (see, for example, [20, Section 7.9]); the derivation here is intended simply to provide an example of
how the information stabilizing random variable can produce information theoretic necessary requirements.
Using the properties of the information stabilizing random variable T , Equation (4) may be derived directly from
the average probability of error requirement as so;
1−  ≤
∑
y,m,k
p(y,m, k)ϕ(m|y, k)
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=
∑
y,m,k,t
p(y,m, k, t)ϕ(m|y, k) (6)
≤ 2−nλn +
∑
(y,m,k,t)∈D+
p(y,m, k, t)ϕ(m|y, k) (7)
= 2−nλn +
∑
(y,m,k,t)∈D+
p(y|m, t)
p(y|t) p(m|t)p(k|y,m, t)p(y, t)ϕ(m|y, k) (8)
≤ 2−nλn +
∑
(y,m,k,t)∈D+
2−[nr−I(Y;M |T=t)−3nλn]p(k|y,m, t)p(y, t)ϕ(m|y, k) (9)
≤ 2−nλn +
∑
t
2−[nr−I(Y;M |T=t)−3nλn]p(t) (10)
≤ 2−nλn + max
t
2−[nr−I(Y;M |T=t)−3nλn]; (11)
where (6) is the law of total probability; (7) is because of Equation (3) and because ϕ is a probability distribution; (8)
is Bayes’ Theorem; (9) is because
p(y|m, t)
p(y|t) p(m|t) ≤ 2
−nr+I(Y;M |T=t)+3nλn
for all (y,m, k, t) ∈ D+; (10) is by recognizing that 2−nr+I(Y;M |T=t)+3nλn is not dependent upon m, k or y;
and (11) is because the maximum is greater than the average.
IV. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS
Our major contribution, Theorem 14, is the characterization of the typical authentication capacity region. Before
presenting this result, it will be helpful to first present a number of intermediary results and explain their relevance.
This is true for both the direct result (that a particular set of (r, α, κ) can be achieved) and the converse result (that
only these (r, α, κ) can be achieved).
We start with the direct results where we shall show that all (r, α, κ) ∈ CTA(pY |X , pZ|X) can be achieved using
the composition of two codes. In particular, these two codes are distinct in the method by which they exploit
the secret key to generate authentication rate. For the first code, the authentication rate will be derived from the
ability of Alice to send secure information over the channel. The second code, on the other hand, will derive the
authentication rate by exploiting Alice and Bob’s shared resource (the secret key) in such a way that is insensitive
to the channel. Thus, these two direct codes can, in some abstract sense, be thought of as a code to exploit the
security of the channel and a code to exploit the security of the source.
For the code that exploits the security of the channel, we opt to use a DM-BCCC(pY |X , pZ|X) code in conjunction
with Lai’s strategy. Doing so leads to the following inner bound on the typical authentication capacity region,
CTA(pY |X , pZ|X).
Theorem 11. For positive real numbers r, α, κ if
r + α ≤ I(Y ;U,W )
α ≤ I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z,U |W )
α− κ ≤ 0,
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for some RVs X,U,W such that (U,W ) c X c (Y, Z), then (r, α, κ) ∈ CTA(pY |X , pZ|X).
See Appendix A for proof.
The rate region derived in Theorem 11 is actually what one should intuitively expect. That is, a DM-BCCC
code allows for the transmission of a secure n(I(Y ;U |W ) − I(Z,U |W ))-bit message. By transmitting the secret
key with this secure message, it ensures that Grı´ma does not learn any information about the key, and hence his
observation does not improve his probability of guessing the key. At the same time, Grı´ma must accurately guess
the key, since Lai’s strategy sees that each of Grı´ma’s possible choices for Bob’s observation correspond to only a
single secret key. Thus, Grı´ma, with no further knowledge of the secret key, would have around a 2−nκ chance of
guessing the key, as long as κ < I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z,U |W ). Of course, for κ ≥ I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z,U |W ) it is always
possible to only use a subset of the secret key bits at a given time, hence the restriction should be considered on
the authentication rate instead of the key consumption rate.
Of interest to note, here, is that using the DM-BCCC code with Lai’s strategy requires there to be a trade-off
between the authentication rate and the message rate, since more bits being used for the secret message means less
bits for the non-secret message. This is reflected in the upper bound on the sum of message rate and authentication
rate.
For the second coding scheme, we will exploit the shared resource, i.e. the secret key, independently of the
channel. In particular, we modify Simmons’ [16] coding scheme into a universally composable code.
Theorem 12. If (r, α, κ) ∈ CTA(pY |X , pZ|X) then
(r − β, α+ β, κ+ 2β) ∈ CTA(pY |X , pZ|X)
for all non-negative β < r.
See Appendix B for proof.
Practically, one may think of the coding scheme which accomplishes the above rate region as follows. Given
a starting code, take nβ-bits assigned to transmitting the message and reallocate them for authentication. Next,
independently for each n(r − β)-bit message, randomly choose an isomorphic nβ to nβ-bit mapping. Now, for
communication, apply the appropriate isomorphic mapping to the first nβ bits of additional secret key and add
to the result (bitwise modulo 2) the remaining nβ bits of additional secret key. The nβ-bit sequence that results
from the addition is then sent using the nβ reallocated for the purpose of authentication. This addition acts as a
one-time pad ensuring the output of the isomorphic mapping is secret from Grı´ma. At the same time, if Grı´ma were
to change the message, he would also need to choose the unique nβ-bit sequence relating to his chosen message
and the additional 2nβ bits of secret key. Grı´ma having no information about what that nβ-sequence should be,
then, should have at most a 2−nβ probability of guessing the correct sequence.
Clearly, this type of code sacrifices message rate and key consumption rate in order to increase the authentication
rate. In particular, an increase of β in the authentication rate requires an increase of 2β in the key consumption
rate. Intuitively, two bits of secret key are consumed for every one bit of authentication needed. This differs from
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Theorem 11 where α = κ up to a given threshold. On the other hand, similar to Theorem 11, the authentication
rate and the message rate satisfy a linear relationship. That is, the sum of the message rate and authentication rate
is preserved.
These results are sufficient to establish the direct portion of CTA(pY |X , pZ|X), thus we move on to results which
support the converse. For the converse, the following intermediary result is needed.
Lemma 13. There exists a function ζ : R+ × Z+ → Z+, where lima→0+
n→∞
ζ(a, n) = 0, such that
α ≤ n−1 min ( I(Y;K) , H(K|Z) ) + ζ(, n) (12)
for all (r, α, κ, , n)-TA codes for DM-AIC(pY |X , pZ|X).
See Appendix C for proofs.
These bounds are due to the traditional “impostor” and “substitution” attacks. In particular, the upper bound
of I(Y;K) is a result of the authentication system needing to be robust against attacks where the adversary
chooses Bob’s observation y according to pY(y). On the other hand, the upper bound of H(K|Z) is a result of
having to defend against attacks where the adversaries chooses y as a function of their observation z according to∑
k p(y|k)p(k|z).
Similar bounds exist in literature for average authentication codes. In particular,
− log2 ωf,ϕ ≤ min ( I(Y;K) , H(K|Z) ) (13)
for any code (f, ϕ), where the I(Y;K) upper bound is from Simmons’ [16, Theorem 3], and the H(K|Z) upper
bound is a consequence of having to defend against attacks in which Grı´ma chooses the most likely key given his
observation and attacks under the assumption it is the correct key and hence,
ωf,ϕ ≥
∑
z
p(z) max
k
p(k|z) (14)
=
∑
z
p(z)2maxk log2 p(k|z) (15)
≥
∑
z
p(z)2
∑
k p(k|z) log2 p(k|z) (16)
≥ 2
∑
k,z p(k,z) log2 p(k|z) = 2−H(K|Z). (17)
Lemma 13, therefore, extends these previous conclusions to the strictly not smaller set of typically achievable
(r, α, κ). This is somewhat unfortunate, though, as Lemma 13 will provide asymptotically tight bounds (as shown
by the upcoming Theorem 14). Hence, if the average authentication region is in general a strict subset of the typical
authentication region (which we conjecture), then it follows that (13) is loose.
These preceding results, plus classic well known techniques (essentially Fourier-Motzkin elimination, Csisza´r
sum identity, and Fenchel-Eggleston-Carathe´odory theorem), combine to prove the main theorem.
Theorem 14. The typical authentication capacity region, CTA(pY |X , pZ|X), is the set of (r, α, κ) such that
r + α ≤ I(Y ;U,W )
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2α− κ ≤ I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z;U |W )
α− κ ≤ 0
for some random variables X,U,W such that W c U c X c (Y,Z) and |U| = (|X |+ 2)(|X |+ 1) and |W| =
|X |+ 2.
See Appendix D for proof.
Fixing a W,U,X , the resulting region is best viewed in terms of the cost of authentication. Specifically, there
exists a threshold4 (I(Y ;U |W ) − I(Z;U |W )) below which every bit of authentication costs one bit of message
rate and one bit of key consumption rate. Above this threshold, every bit of authentication costs one bit of message
rate and two bits of key consumption rate until no message rate remains. It is not surprising that authentication
rate requires key consumption rate, more interesting is that authentication and message rate are actually a shared
resource.
Of course, by allowing W,U,X to vary means that these trade-offs may not be necessarily true depending on
the exact message rate, authentication rate, and key consumption rate. An important threshold in this regards is the
threshold for bits of authentication below which it is possible to achieve the max sum of message and authentication
rate and still have the authentication rate equal to the key consumption rate. Specifically, this value is
max
W :W c X c (Y,Z) I(Y ;X|W )− I(Z;X|W ),
where the distribution of X maximizes I(Y ;X). Alternatively, in environments where maximizing the authentication
and message rates is critical, this threshold represents the point at which further bits of authentication cost twice as
much in key consumption. Regardless, this threshold represents where authentication rate costs the least to achieve.
Finally, it is important to note that the fact that authentication rate and message rate share a finite resource must
also hold true under the average authentication metric. Indeed, obviously if (r, α, κ) ∈ CAA(pY |X , pZ|X), then
(r, α, κ) ∈ CTA(pY |X , pZ|X). Furthermore, as Part I demonstrated, the sum of message rate and authentication rate
can equal the channel’s capacity under the average authentication metric. Therefore, it must follow that, even under
the average authentication measure, increasing the authentication rate past a given threshold must also decrease the
message rate.
V. EXAMPLES
We now provide some numerical examples in order to illustrate the trade-offs between the three parameters that
make up the typical authentication capacity region. The case where both pY |X and pZ|X are binary symmetric
channels (BSC) is considered. That is, if pY |X is a BSC with parameter λt ∈ [0, 1/2], then X = Y = {0, 1} and
pY |X(0|1) = pY |X(1|0) = λt. We shall use λt throughout this section to represent the BSC parameter of pY |X and
λq to represent the BSC parameter of pZ|X .
4It is perhaps best to view the second inequality as α+ (α− κ) ≤ I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z;U |W ).
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Since both channels are BSC, the channel with the larger λ value will be stochastically degraded with respect to
the channel with the smaller λ. In the case that λt ≤ λq , then I(Y ;W ) ≥ I(Z;W ) and I(Y ;X|W ) ≥ I(Z;X|W )
for all W c X c (Y,Z) by the data processing inequality, hence the region dictated by Theorem 14 can be
simplified to
r + α ≤ I(Y ;X)
2α− κ ≤ I(Y ;X)− I(Z;X)
α− κ ≤ 0.
On the other hand, when λq ≤ λt, this same property simplifies the region to
r + α ≤ I(Y ;X)
2α− κ ≤ 0
α− κ ≤ 0.
Three different plots are annotated to illustrate various considerations for the region, including the trade-off
between message rate and typical authentication, the efficiency of consumed key material, and the effects of main
channel quality including both the more noisy and less noisy regimes.
A significant result present in both capacity regions of Theorem 11 and Theorem 14 is that communication and
authentication must share the main channel capacity. Fig. 2 depicts the trade-off for both the more noisy and less
noisy channel cases. The linear trade-off between r and α is ultimately limited by the channel or key rate. In the
first less noisy case, α is limited by the secrecy capacity of the channel pair, while in the second case, it is limited
by the amount of key available since κ = .3 is less than the secrecy capacity of the channel. Finally when the main
channel is more noisy, α is limited by half the key κ/2. The ability to achieve a nonzero authentication rate in such
cases is due to the incorporation of Simmons’ noiseless strategy in our code, unlike Lai’s region (Theorem 11)
where no authentication is possible. The region is clearly improved when secrecy capacity is available and there is
enough key material to take full advantage of it.
With that in mind, we next explore how efficient key use is in terms of the amount of authentication rate achieved
by each additional bit of key for a few different scenarios. Key consumption is most efficient when secrecy capacity
is available and used fully. In other words, as much key as possible should be sent using the secrecy provided
by the channel rather than by Simmons’ strategy. In fact, using secrecy capacity is twice as efficient, as depicted
in Fig. 3. The two less noisy cases show that each bit of key increases the authentication rate the same amount.
However, once the secrecy capacity has been depleted, the effect of each additional bit of key is halved since
the less efficient Simmons’ scheme must be used instead. For a more noisy main channel, no secrecy capacity is
available, so only Simmons’ strategy is used, maintaining a constant efficiency of 1/2 for all key consumption rates.
Ultimately, though, authentication in all cases is limited by the main channel capacity and desired message rate.
Next, the effect of main channel quality on the amount of authentication possible for different key consumption
rates is shown in Fig. 4. As one would expect, lower authentication rates are achievable for decreasing main channel
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Fig. 2. Message rate (r) vs. authentication rate (α) for both less noisy and more noisy main channel for the typical authentication capacity
region (Theorem 14).
Fig. 3. The amount of authentication rate gained per increase in key consumption rate is better when secrecy capacity is nonzero. Curves
obtained for the typical authentication capacity region (Theorem 14).
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Fig. 4. Authentication capabilities decrease with worsening channel conditions. Curves obtained for the typical authentication capacity region
(Theorem 14).
quality. As seen especially in the κ = .3 and κ = .1 cases, authentication rate is always limited by the amount of key
material possessed even when the amount of secrecy capacity available exceeds it. In the plot, this is demonstrated
by the flat portion of the curves that show that the channel pair can accommodate the entire key, producing α = κ,
until the main channel worsens and secrecy drops below κ which then becomes the limiting factor. As the nonzero
secrecy capacity point is approached, even though secrecy capacity is available, the message rate takes up a large
portion of the main channel capacity, limiting the authentication rate further. Once secrecy capacity is lost, only
the κ = .1 case achieves the maximum rate of α = κ/2. The three cases eventually converge as a result of the
decreasing main channel quality and the inability to sustain the desired message rate and authentication rate until
both cannot be supported.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 11
We will use DM-BCCC codes (Definition 2) with Lai’s Strategy (Definition 5) to prove Theorem 11. Specif-
ically, we will first highlight two key benefits of Lai’s Strategy. Next, in Appendix A-B, we transform codes
for the DM-BCCC(pY |X , pZ|X) into codes using Lai’s Strategy for the DM-AIC(pY |X , pZ|X), and then use the
properties of Lai’s Strategy and the original DM-BCCC codes to derive the relevant operational measures. Finally,
in Appendix A-C, we use these transformed codes in conjunction with Corollary 9 to prove Theorem 11.
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A. Key features of Lai’s Strategy
The first major benefit of using Lai’s strategy is that it simplifies ωf,ϕ. Indeed, by ensuring that for each y there
is at most a single k such that ϕ(!|y, k) 6= 1 it forces Grı´ma to know the exact value of k to interlope.
Lemma 15. If (f, ϕ) satisfies Lai’s strategy then
ωf,ϕ(z,m, k) ≤ ψ˜(k|z),
where
ψ˜(a|z) =

∑
y:ϕ(M|y,k)>0 ψ(y|z) if a ∈ K∑
y:ϕ(!|y,k)>0 ψ(y|z) otherwise
and ψ˜ ∈ P({K, !}|Z).
Proof: This first part of the lemma follows near immediately from definitions,
ωf,ϕ(z,m, k) =
∑
y
ψ(y|z)ϕ(M−{m}|y, k)
≤
∑
y
ψ(y|z)ϕ(M|y, k) (18)
= ψ˜(k|z), (19)
where the last line follows because ϕ is deterministic from Lai’s Strategy.
Next, to prove that ψ˜ is a valid probability distribution, we must show that
∑
k∈{K,!} ψ˜(k|z) = 1 for all z.
Consider
∑
k∈{K,!}
ψ˜(k|z) =
∑
y
ψ(y|z)1 {ϕ(!|y, k) > 0}+
∑
k∈K
∑
y
ψ(y|z)1 {ϕ(M|y, k) > 0} (20)
=
∑
y
ψ(y|z)
(
1 {ϕ(!|y, k) > 0}+
∑
k∈K
1 {ϕ(M|y, k) > 0}
)
(21)
=
∑
y
ψ(y|z) = 1, (22)
where Equation (21) is because Lai’s Strategy requires that there is one, and only one, value of a ∈ {M, !} such
that ϕ(a|y, k) = 1 for each y and k, proving the assertion.
Another benefit of Lai’s Strategy is that the information about the key is sent privately. In fact, keeping the
mutual information allows for use of the following lemma.
Lemma 16. If I(A;B) ≤ c then
Pr (p(A|B) > p(A)2nc) ≤ 1
n
+
1
nc
.
Proof: Let Q be the set of (a, b) such that p(a|b) > p(a)2nc, furthermore let Sˆ be the subset of (a, b)
such that (a, b) /∈ Q and p(a|b) ≥ p(a), and S˜ be the subset of (a, b) /∈ Q such that p(a|b) < p(a). Note that
Q∪ Sˆ ∪ S˜ = A× B.
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Now, if I(A;B) ≤ c, then
c =
∑
Q
p(a, b) log2
p(a|b)
p(a)
+
∑
Sˆ
p(a, b) log2
p(a|b)
p(a)
+
∑
S˜
p(a, b) log2
p(a|b)
p(a)
(23)
follows by expanding the definition of mutual information, and organizing the summation terms into the different
sets. The summation over each set can be lower bounded in a unique way: log2
p(a|b)
p(a) ≥ nc for all terms in Q; and
p(a, b) log2
p(a|b)
p(a)
≥ −p(a, b) p(a)
p(a|b) = p(a)p(b)
for all terms in Sˆ; finally p(a, b) log2 p(a|b)p(a) is negative for all terms in S˜. Using these observations, then
c ≥ Pr ((A,B) ∈ Q)nc− 1 (24)
follows. Solving Equation (24) for Pr ((A,B) ∈ Q) proves the lemma.
B. Transforming DM-BCCC codes into DM-AIC codes
Theorem 17. If
(f˜ , ϕ˜, ϕˆ) ∈ P(X |M0,M1,Ms)× P(M0,M1,Ms|Y)× P(M0|Z)
is a code (r0, r1, rs, , n)-code for the DM-BCCC(pY |X , pZ|X), then
(f, ϕ) ∈ P(X |M,K)× P({M, !}|Y ,K),
where K =Ms, M =M1, and
f(x|m, k) = 1|M0|
∑
m0∈M0
f˜(x|m0,m, k) (25)
ϕ(a|y, k) =

1
|M0|
∑
m0∈M0 ϕ˜(m0, a, k|y) if a 6= !
1−∑m0∈M0
m1∈M1
ϕ˜(m0,m1, k|y) otherwise,
(26)
is a (r1, rs − 2, rs, + 1n + 1n + 2−n, n)-TA code for the DM-AIC(pY |X , pZ|X).
Proof: First, the message rate is r1, the key consumption rate is rs, and the blocklength is n, and the probability
of message error is  since M =M1, K =Ms, and the block-length has not changed, and the code has not been
changed, respectively. This leaves in question the authentication rate and the authentication fault tolerance.
For the authentication rate and authentication fault tolerance, let A represent the set of all z, k such that p(k|z) >
p(k)2n. Now observe that
max
ψ∈P(Y|Z)
Pr
(−n−1 log2 ωf,ϕ(Z,M,K) < rs − 2)
≤ max
ψ∈P(Y|Z)
Pr
(−n−1 log2 ψ(K|Z) < rs − 2) (27)
= max
ψ∈P(Y|Z)
∑
(k,z)∈A
p(z, k)1
{−n−1 log2 ψ(k|z) < rs − 2}
+
∑
(k,z)/∈A
p(z, k)1
{−n−1 log2 ψ(k|z) < rs − 2} , (28)
January 7, 2020 DRAFT
23
where Equation (27) follows directly from Lemma 15. The sums in Equation (28) can be handled separately with
some ease. First, ∑
(k,z)∈A
p(z, k)1
{−n−1 log2 ψ(k|z) < rs − 2}
≤ Pr ((K,Z) ∈ A) ≤ 1
n
+
1
n
(29)
follows directly from Lemma 16. On the other hand,∑
(k,z)/∈A
p(z, k)1
{−n−1 log2 ψ(k|z) < rs − 2}
≤
∑
(k,z)/∈A
2−nrs+np(z)2nrs−2nψ(k|z) (30)
≤ 2−n (31)
where (30) follows because p(k|z) ≤ p(k)2n ≤ 2−nrs+n for each (k, z) /∈ A and because
1
{−n−1 log2 ψ(k|z) < rs − 2} ≤ 2nrs−2nψ(k|z)
since ψ only produces positive values; and (31) follows because ψ is a probability distribution. Combining Equa-
tions (29) and (31) yields
max
ψ∈P(Y|Z)
Pr
(−n−1 log2 ωf,ϕ(Z,M,K) < rs − 2) ≤ 1n + 1n + 2−n (32)
proving that the code has typical authentication rate rs − 2 with failure tolerance 1n + 1n + 2−n.
C. Proof of Theorem 11
Proof: First note that there exists a sequence of (0, rn, αn, n, n)-codes for the DM-BCCC(pY |X , pZ|X) such
that
lim
n→∞(rn, αn, n) = (r, α, 0) (33)
for all r and α
r + α ≤ I(Y ;U,W ) (34)
α ≤ I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z;U |W ) (35)
by Corollary 9. Note, we may assume limn→∞ n = ∞ since it is always possible to inject error into a decoder.
This also implies a sequence of (rn, αn−2n, αn, n+ 1n + 1nn +2−nn , n)-TA codes for the DM-AIC(pY |X , pZ|X)
where
lim
n→∞(rn, αn − 2n, n +
1
n
+
1
nn
+ 2−nn) = (r, α, α), (36)
via Theorem 17. Combining Equation (36) with the operational definitions proves that if
r + α ≤ I(Y ;U,W ) (37)
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α ≤ I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z;U |W ) (38)
α− κ ≤ 0, (39)
then (r, α, κ) ∈ CTA(pY |X , pZ|X).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 12
In order to prove Theorem 12, it will be necessary to first prove the following theorem.
Theorem 18. For n ≥ 3 and δ < 524 , if a (r, α, κ, δ, n) code for DM-AIC(pY |X , pZ|X) exists, then for each
β ∈
[
2 log2 γnn , r
]
, where γ , (4r+2) ln 2−1+2 ln 2 , there also exists a
(r − β, α+ β − δ˜n, κ+ 2β, δ˜n, n)-code,
where δ˜n , max(2 log2(γn)/n, 2δ +
√
δ + (γn)−1).
Theorem 18 is proved in Appendices B-A–B-C, and constitutes the majority of the work necessary in proving
Theorem 12. Using Theorem 18, we prove Theorem 12 in Appendix B-D. First, we describe the proof of Theorem 18.
The code construction engages by being given a (r, α, κ, δ, n) code, (f, ϕ), for DM-AIC(pY |X , pZ|X) and from
it randomly selecting a new code (f˜ , ϕ˜). Here, the set of 2n(κ+2β) secret keys for (f˜ , ϕ˜) will be represented as two
smaller secret keys chosen from sets of size 2nκ and 2n2β . For each of the secret keys from the set of size 2n2β ,
there will exist an injective mapping from the set of messages for (f˜ , ϕ˜) (2n(r−β) elements) to the set of messages
for (f, ϕ) (2nr elements).
For transmission of a given message using (f˜ , ϕ˜), encoder f˜ acts by applying the injective mapping associated
with the secret key from the set of size 2n2β to the input message, and then using the resulting message and the
secret key from the set of size 2nκ as the input to the original encoder f . On the other end, the decoder ϕ˜ first
applies the decoder ϕ to the received message with appropriate secret key, and then inverts the injective mapping
with the appropriate secret key. If the symbol can not be inverted, then deception is declared. Using this scheme,
it is immediately clear that the resulting message rate of the code is r − β and the resulting key consumption rate
is κ+ 2β. This leaves the determination of the authentication rate and probability of error.
The authentication rate and probability of error of (f˜ , ϕ˜) will be put in terms of these same measures for (f, ϕ).
In order to assist the preceding, let Z˜, M˜ ,K1,K2 be the RVs representing Grı´ma’s observation, the message, first
secret key, and second secret key of (f˜ , ϕ˜), respectively, while letting Z,M,K be the RVs representing Grı´ma’s
observation, the message, and secret key of (f, ϕ), respectively. Furthermore, let correlated RVs (F˜ , Φ˜) represent
the randomly chosen encoder and decoder.
In appendix B-A, a code construction method is presented which specifies RVs (F˜ , Φ˜). With regards to the
message error of this code construction,
Pr
(
εF˜ ,Φ˜ ≥
√
δ
)
≤
√
δ (40)
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is shown in Appendix B-B. While for the authentication rate analysis, it is shown in Appendix B-C that with
probability greater than
1− 2−2(n(r+1)−1) (41)
a code (F˜ , Φ˜) = (f˜ , ϕ˜) is chosen such that
Pr
(
ωf˜ ,ϕ˜(Z˜, M˜ ,K1,K2) ≥ 2−n(α+β−2 log2(γn)/n)
)
≤ 2δ + 1
γn
, (42)
where γ = (4r+2) ln 2−1+2 ln 2 .
Note that there must exist at least one choice of (f˜ , ϕ˜) that satisfies Equation (42) and εf˜ ,ϕ˜ <
√
δ simultaneously
since δ < 524 and n ≥ 3 guarantees 1− 2−(n(r+1)−1) − 2δ − 1γn > 0. Hence, proving the existence of the
(r − β, α+ β − 2 log2(γn)/n, κ+ 2β,
√
δ + 2−n(r+1)−1 + 2δ + (γn)−1, n)-code
guaranteed in the theorem statement.
Proof:
A. Code Construction
For a given positive real number β ≤ r, we shall use the following construction to transform codes designed
to send messages chosen uniformly from M , {1, . . . , 2nr} with a secret key drawn uniformly from K1 ,
{1, . . . , 2nκ}, into codes to send messages chosen uniformly from M˜ , {1, . . . , 2n(r−β)} with a secret key drawn
uniformly from K1×K2, where K2 , {1, . . . , 2n2β}. The starting codes will be denoted (f, ϕ) ∈ P(X |M,K1)×
P(M∪ {!} |Y ,K1), and the resulting code after the transformation will be denoted (f˜ , ϕ˜) ∈ P(X |M˜,K1,K2)×
P(M˜ ∪ {!} |Y ,K1,K2).
Random codebook generation: Independently for each k2 ∈ K2, select a mapping gk2 : M˜ →M uniformly from
the set of all injective mappings from M˜ to M.
Encoders:
f˜(x|m˜, k1, k2) , f(x|gk2(m˜), k1)
for each (x, m˜, k1, k2) ∈ X × M˜ ×K1 ×K2.
Decoders:
ϕ˜(m˜|y, k1, k2) =
ϕ(gk2(m˜)|y, k1) if m˜ 6= !ϕ(!|y, k) + ϕ(M− gk2(M˜)|y, k1) otherwise ,
for all (y, k1, k2) ∈ Y ×K1 ×K2, m˜ ∈ M˜ ∪ !.
B. Message error analysis
The average probability of message error over all possible (f˜ , ϕ˜) is equal to the probability of message error for
(f, ϕ). Indeed, this is a direct consequence of
εf˜ ,ϕ˜(m˜, k1, k2) = 1−
∑
y∈Y,
x∈X
ϕ˜(m˜|y, k1, k2)pY |X(y|x)f˜(x|m˜, k1, k2)
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= 1−
∑
y∈Y,
x∈X
ϕ(gk2(m˜)|y, k1)pY |X(y|x)f(x|gk2(m˜), k1)
= εf,ϕ(gk2(m˜), k1), (43)
and the fact that the mapping gk2 is chosen uniformly from the set of of all injective mappings. Therefore,
E[εF˜ ,Φ˜] =
∑
m˜∈M˜,k1∈K1
2−n(r−β+κ)
( ∑
m∈M
2−nrεf,ϕ(m, k1)
)
= εf,ϕ ≤ δ (44)
since gk2 is chosen uniformly from the set of all injective mappings M˜ →M. Now,
Pr
(
εF˜ ,Φ˜ ≥
√
δ
)
≤
√
δ
directly follows from combining Equation (44) and Markov’s inequality.
C. Typical authentication rate analysis
Here, we shall show that
Pr
(
ωf˜ ,ϕ˜(Z, M˜ ,K1,K2) ≥ 2−n(α+β−2 log2(γn)/n)
)
≤ 2δ + 1
γn
(45)
as long as (f˜ , ϕ˜) ∈ G∗ ∩ G†, where G∗ is the set of (f˜ , ϕ˜) for which∣∣∣{k2 : {m,m′} ⊆ gk2(M˜)}∣∣∣ ≤ nγ, (46)
for all m ∈M and m′(6= m) ∈M, while G† is the set of (f˜ , ϕ˜) such that∣∣∣{k2 : m ∈ gk2(M˜)}∣∣∣ ≤ 21+nβ (47)
for all m ∈M. For clarity of presentation, in Appendix B-C1, we show that if (f˜ , ϕ˜) ∈ G†∩G∗, then Equation (45)
holds, and thus if (f˜ , ϕ˜) ∈ G† ∩ G∗, then the new code has an authentication rate of α + β − log2(γn)/n and an
authentication tolerance of 2δ + 1γn . Next, in Appendix B-C2, we show
Pr
(
(F˜ , Φ˜) /∈ G∗
)
≤ e−1 · 2−2(n(r+1)−1), (48)
and in Appendix B-C3, we show
Pr
(
(F˜ , Φ˜) /∈ G†
)
≤ 2nre−(2 ln 2−1)2nβ (49)
Thus if β ≥ log2(γn)/n, then
Pr
(
(F˜ , Φ˜) /∈ G† ∩ G∗
)
≤ 2−2(n(r+1)−1) (50)
follows from Equations (48) and (49) and the union bound. Since 2−2(n(r+1)−1) < 1 for all n ≥ 2, it proves there
must exist at least one (f˜ , ϕ˜) ∈ G† ∩ G∗, thus proving the theorem statement.
Proofs of both Equations (48) and (49) will use the following lemma from Csisza´r and Ko¨rner.
Lemma 19. ([19, Lemma 17.9]) The probability that in k independent trials an event of probability q occurs
less/more than αqk times, according as α ≶ 1, is bounded above by e−c(α)qk where c(α) = α lnα− α+ 1.
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Remark This result implies that if W1, . . . ,Wn are independent Bernoulli random variables and t ≥
∑n
i=1 E[Wi],
then
Pr
(
n∑
i=1
Wi > t+
n∑
i=1
E[Wi]
)
≤ max
u∈[0,t]
e−[(u+t) ln(1+
t
u )−t] = e−(2 ln 2−1)t.
1) Typical authentication rate given (f˜ , ϕ˜) ∈ G∗ ∩ G†: In proving Equation (45) holds for all (f˜ , ϕ˜) ∈ G∗ ∩ G†,
it will be helpful to first prove that
pZ˜,M˜,K1,K2(z, m˜, k1, k2) = pZ,M,K(z, gk2(m˜), k1)2
−nβ , (51)
as well as prove that if (f˜ , ϕ˜) ∈ G∗, then
|K∗2(z,m, k)| < 2nβ(γn)−1 (52)
where5
K∗2(z,m, k) ,
{
k2 :
ωf˜ ,ϕ˜(z, g
−1
k2
(m), k1, k2)
ωf,ϕ(z,m, k1)
> 2−nβ(γn)2
}
for all m ∈M, z ∈ Z, k ∈ K1.
First, Equation (51) is a consequence of X˜|{M˜ = m˜,K1 = k1,K2 = k2} being the same as X|{M =
gk2(m˜),K = k1} when M˜,M,K1,K2,K are uniform over their support sets, since then
pZ˜,M˜,K1,K2(z, m˜, k1, k2) = pZ˜|M˜,K1,K2(z|m˜, k1, k2)2−n(r+β+κ)
= pZ|M,K(z|gk2(m˜), k1)2−n(r+β+κ)
= pZ,M,K(z, gk2(m˜), k1)2
−nβ
follows.
Next, for all z,m, k1, Equation (52) can be derived as follows:
|K∗2(z,m, k1)|2−nβ(γn)2ωf,ϕ(z,m, k1)
<
∑
k2∈K∗2(z,m,k1)
ωf˜ ,ϕ˜(z, g
−1
k2
(m), k1, k2) (53)
=
∑
k2∈K∗2(z,m,k1)
∑
y,m˜′ 6=g−1k2 (m)
ψ(y|z)ϕ˜(m˜′|y, k1, k2) (54)
=
∑
k2∈K∗2(z,m,k1)
∑
y,m′ 6=m
ψ(y|z)ϕ(m′|y, k1)1
{
m′ ∈ gk2(M˜)
}
(55)
≤
∑
y,m′ 6=m
ψ(y|z)ϕ(m′|y, k1)
∑
k2
1
{
{m,m′} ⊂ gk2(M˜)
}
(56)
≤ (γn)ωf,ϕ(z,m, k1); (57)
where (53) is because
|K∗2(z,m, k1)|2−nβ(γn)2ωf,ϕ(z,m, k1) =
∑
k2∈K∗2(z,m,k1)
2−nβ(γn)2ωf,ϕ(z,m, k1)
5Here
ω
f˜,ϕ˜
(z,g−1
k2
(m),k1,k2)
ωf,ϕ(z,m,k1)
, 0 if g−1k2 (m) does not exist.
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and 2−nβ(γn)2ωf,ϕ(z,m, k1) ≤ ωf˜ ,ϕ˜(z, g−1k2 (m), k1, k2) for all k2 ∈ K∗2(z,m, k1); (54) is by the definition of
function ω; (55) is by the definition of function ϕ˜; (56) is by exchanging the summation basis and recognizing that
K∗2(z,m, k1) ⊆ {k2 : m ∈ gk2(M˜)}; finally (57) is because (f˜ , ϕ˜) ∈ G∗ and by the definition of ω.
With Equations (51) and (52) in hand, the probability that ωf˜ ,ϕ˜(Z˜, M˜ ,K1,K2) ≥ 2−n(α+β−2 log2(γn)/n can be
upper bounded by putting it in terms of the probability that ωf,ϕ(Z,M,K) ≥ 2−nα as follows:∑
z,m˜,k1,k2:
ωf˜,ϕ˜(z,m˜,k1,k2)≥2−n(α+β−2 log2(γn)/n)
pZ˜,M˜,K1,K2(z, m˜, k1, k2)
=
∑
z,m,m˜,k1,k2:
ωf˜,ϕ˜(z,g
−1
k2
(m),k1,k2)≥2−n(α+β−2 log2(γn)/n)
1 {gk2(m˜) = m} pZ˜,M˜,K1,K2(z, m˜, k1, k2) (58)
=
∑
z,m,m˜,k1,k2:
ωf˜,ϕ˜(z,g
−1
k2
(m),k1,k2)≥2−n(α+β−2 log2(γn)/n)
1 {gk2(m˜) = m} pZ,M,K(z,m, k1)2−nβ (59)
=
∑
z,m,k1,k2:
ωf˜,ϕ˜(z,g
−1
k2
(m),k1,k2)≥2−n(α+β−2 log2(γn)/n)
1
{
m ∈ gk2(M˜)
}
pZ,M,K(z,m, k1)2
−nβ (60)
≤
∑
z,m,k1,
k2∈K∗2(z,m,k1)
1
{
m ∈ gk2(M˜)
}
pZ,M,K(z,m, k1)2
−nβ
+
∑
z,m,k1,k2:
ωf,ϕ(z,m,k1)≥2−nα
1
{
m ∈ gk2(M˜)
}
pZ,M,K(z,m, k1)2
−nβ (61)
≤
∑
z,m,k1
pZ,M,K(z,m, k1)(γn)
−1 +
∑
z,m,k1:
ωf,ϕ(z,m,k1)≥2−nα
pZ,M,K(z,m, k1)2 (62)
≤ (γn)−1 + 2δ (63)
where (58) is because gk2 is an injective mapping and thus the is a single m for each k2, m˜; (59) is by the
earlier observation of (51); (60) follows by summing over m˜ ∈ M˜; (61) follows by splitting the summation
terms based upon whether or not ωf˜ ,ϕ˜(z, g
−1
k2
(m), k1, k2) > 2
−nβ(γn)2ωf,ϕ(z,m, k1), and then recognizing that
ωf,ϕ(z,m, k1) ≥ 2−nα for all (z,m, k1, k2) such that ωf˜ ,ϕ˜(z, g−1k2 (m), k1, k2) ≤ 2−nβ(γn)2ωf,ϕ(z,m, k1) and
ωf˜ ,ϕ˜(z, g
−1
k2
(m), k1, k2) ≥ 2−n(α+β−2 log2(γn)/n); (62) is because (f˜ , ϕ˜) ∈ G∗ ∩ G†, where more specifically the
first summation’s bound is due to Equation (52) since (f˜ , ϕ˜) ∈ G∗ and the second summation’s bound is since
(f˜ , ϕ˜) ∈ G†; and finally (63) is by the law of total probability and because (f, ϕ) is assumed to be a (r, α, κ, δ, n)-TA
code. Equation (63) confirms Equation (45).
2) Probability (F˜ , Φ˜) ∈ G∗: To prove Equation (48), first fix any m ∈M and m′( 6= m) ∈M and let
Ak2 , 1
{
{m,m′} ⊆ Gk2(M˜)
}
. (64)
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Of importance is that Ak2 and Ak′2 are independent for k2 6= k′2 since the mappings Gk2 are independently chosen
for each k2 ∈ K2. Furthermore,
Pr (Ak2 = 1) =
 2nr − 2
2n(r−β) − 2
/ 2nr
2n(r−β)

= 2−nβ
2n(r−β) − 1
2nr − 1 = 2
−2nβ 1− 2n(β−r)
1− 2−nr ≤ 2
−2nβ (65)
since Gk2(M˜) is uniform over the size 2n(r−β) subsets of M. As a result of these properties,
Pr
( ∑
k2∈K2
Ak2 > γn
)
≤ Pr
( ∑
k2∈K2
Ak2 > γn− 1 +
∑
k2∈K2
E[Ak2 ]
)
≤ e−(2 ln 2−1)(γn−1) = e−1 · 2−4nr−2(n−1) (66)
follows by applying Lemma 19. Equation (48) now follows by using the union bound to consider all m ∈M and
m′( 6= m) ∈M simultaneously.
3) Probability (F˜ , Φ˜) ∈ G†: First, fix a m ∈ M, and let Bk2 = 1
{
m ∈ Gk2(M˜)
}
. Clearly, Bk2 and Bk′2 are
independent for k2 6= k′2 since Gk2 and Gk′2 are independent. Furthermore, Pr (Bk2 = 1) = 2−nβ since Gk2(M˜)
is uniform over the size 2n(r−β) subsets of M. Hence,
Pr
( ∑
k2∈K2
Bk2 − 2nβ > 2nβ
)
≤ e−(2 ln 2−1)2nβ (67)
follows from Lemma 19 since
E
[ ∑
k2∈K2
Bk2
]
=
∑
k2∈K2
2−nβ = 2nβ .
Equation (49) now follows by using the union bound to consider all m ∈M simultaneously.
D. Proof of Theorem 12
Proof:
If (r, α, κ) ∈ CTA(pY |X , pZ|X), then there exists a sequence of (rn, αn, κn, δn, n) codes, (fn, ϕn), such that
lim
n→∞ |(rn, αn, κn, δn)− (r, α, κ, 0)| = 0. (68)
By definition, then, there must exist an n′ ≥ 3 such that δn ≤ 524 and rn ≥ 2 log2 γnn
(
where γ = (4r+2) ln 2−1+2 ln 2
)
for
all n ≥ n′. Hence, for any positive β < r, there also exists a sequence of
(rn − βn, αn + βn − 2 log2 γn
n
, κn + 2βn,
√
δn + 2
−n(r+1)−1 + 2δn +
1
γn
, n) codes,
where limn→∞ βn = β, by Theorem 18. Taking the limit point of this sequence of codes proves that
(r − β, α+ β, κ+ 2β) ∈ CTA(pY |X , pZ|X).
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 13
We shall break the proof of Lemma 13 into two parts. In both parts, we shall assume that (f, ϕ) is a (r, α, κ, δ, n)-
TA code for DM-AIC(pY |X , pZ|X), and then show in Appendix C-A that this requires
α ≤ n−1I(Y;K) + ζ(δ, n) (69)
for some ζ(δ, n) such that limδ→0+
n→∞
ζ(δ, n) = 0, and similarly show in Appendix C-B it also requires
α ≤ n−1H(K|Z) + ζ˜(δ, n) (70)
for some ζ˜(δ, n) such that limδ→0+
n→∞
ζ˜(δ, n) = 0. Clearly, having validated Equations (69) and (70), then Lemma 13
will follow by choosing the larger of ζ˜ and ζ as the function presented in the lemma statement.
For the proofs of both Equations (69) and (70), we shall make use of the partitioning random variable, T ,
constructed in [17]. Discussion on the properties of the random variable can be found in Section III-D. For these
proofs we shall use the sequence λn discussed prior, for which limn→∞ λn = 0 and limn→∞ nλn =∞. We shall
also introduce a new sequence of error terms, νn , δ+ 3 ·2−nλn , which converge to δ as n→∞, and furthermore
converge to 0 if n→∞ and δ → 0.
Before moving to proving Equations (69) and (70), we will need to prove the following technical lemma.
Lemma 20. For r ≥ 2λn, if (f, ϕ) is a (r, α, κ, δ, n)-TA code for DM-AIC(pY |X , pZ|X), then
Pr (τ(M,K, T ) < 1−√νn) ≤ √νn
where
τ(m, k, t) ,
∑
y:(y,k,t)∈D+
p(y|k, t)ϕ(M−{m}|y, k),
and νn , δ + 3 · 2−nλn .
Proof: First, observe the following lower bounds on the expectation of τ(M,K, T );∑
m,k,t
p(m, k, t)τ(m, k, t)
≥ −2−nλn +
∑
m,k,t
p(m, k, t)
∑
y
p(y|k, t)ϕ(M−{m}|y, k) (71)
≥ −2−nλn +
∑
m,k,t
−p(m, k, t)p(m|k, t) +
∑
y,m,k,t
p(y,m, k, t)ϕ(m|y, k) (72)
≥ −2−nr+nλn − 2 · 2−nλn + 1− δ ≥ 1− νn; (73)
where (71) follows because the probability that (Y,M,K, T ) /∈ D+ is less than 2−nλn ; (72) is because∑
y
p(y|k, t)ϕ(M−{m′}|y, k) ≥
∑
y,m
p(y,m|k, t)ϕ(m− {m′}|y, k)
≥ −pM |K,T (m′|k, t) +
∑
y,m
p(y,m|k, t)ϕ(m|y, k);
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and (73) is because the probability p(M |K,T ) < 2−nr+nλn is less than 2−nλn , the probability of message error
must be less than 1− δ, and r > 2λn. Next, observe the following upper bound on the expectation of τ(M,K, T );∑
m,k,t
p(m, k, t)τ(m, k, t)
≤
∑
m,k,t:
τ(m,k,t)>1−√νn
p(m, k, t) +
∑
m,k,t:
τ(m,k,t)≤1−√νn
p(m, k, t) (1−√νn) (74)
= 1− Pr (τ(M,K, T ) ≤ 1−√νn) (1−√νn) . (75)
Combining these two observations and solving for Pr
(
τ(M,K, T ) ≤ 1−√νn
)
proves the lemma statement.
With this technical lemma in hand, we proceed to the proof of Lemma 13.
Proof:
A. α ≤ n−1I(Y;K) + ζ(δ, n)
Let (f, ϕ) be a (r, α, κ, δ, n)-TA code for DM-AIC(pY |X , pZ|X). By definition, a (r, α, κ, δ, n)-TA code requires
δ ≥ max
ψ∈P(Y|Z)
Pr
(∑
y
ψ(y|Z)ϕ(M−{M}|y,K) ≥ 2−nα
)
(76)
≥ Pr
(∑
y
pY(y)ϕ(M−{M}|y,K) ≥ 2−nα
)
(77)
since pY ∈ P(Y |Z). Now, introducing the information stabilizing random variable T (see Section III-D) into the
RHS of (77) provides
δ ≥
∑
m,k,t
Pr
∑
t˜∈T
pT (t˜)
∑
y
p(y|t˜)ϕ(M−{m}|y, k) ≥ 2−nα
 p(m, k, t) (78)
≥
∑
m,k,t
1
p(t) ∑
y∈Y:(y,k,t)∈D+
p(y|t)ϕ(M−{m}|y, k) ≥ 2−nα
 p(m, k, t), (79)
where D+ is the stabilized set discussed in Section III-D, since all summands inside the indicator are positive. But,
p(y|t) = p(y|t)
p(y|k, t)p(y|k, t) ≥ 2
−I(Y;K|T=t)−2nλnp(y|k, t) (80)
for all (y, k, t) ∈ D+. Hence,
δ ≥
∑
m,k,t
1
{
2−I(Y;K|T=t)−2nλnp(t)τ(m, k, t) ≥ 2−nα
}
p(m, k, t) (81)
by combining Equations (79) and (80). Furthermore,
δ +
√
νn ≥
∑
t
1
{
2−I(Y;K|T=t)−2nλnp(t) (1−√νn) ≥ 2−nα
}
p(t), (82)
recalling that νn , δ + 3 · 2−nλn , by using that
1
{
2−I(Y;K|T=t)−2nλnp(t)τ(m, k, t) ≥ 2−nα
}
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≥ 1
{
2−I(Y;K|T=t)−2nλnp(t) (1−√νn) ≥ 2−nα
}
− 1 {τ(m, k, t) < 1−√νn}
and then applying Lemma 20 to the sum of the 1
{
τ(m, k, t) < 1−√νn
}
terms.
Equation (82) provides a bound on the number of t for which I(Y;K|T = t) can be less than nα. With this in
mind, observe that
I(Y;K) + 2H(T ) + 2nλn − log2 (1−
√
νn)
≥
∑
t
p(t) [I(Y;K|T = t)− log2 p(t) + 2nλn − log2 (1−
√
νn)] (83)
≥ nα
∑
t
p(t)1
{
2−I(Y;K|T=t)−2nνnp(t)(1−√νn) < 2−nα
}
(84)
≥ nα(1− δ −√νn), (85)
where (85) is where Equation (82) is specifically used. Collecting all the vanishing terms in Equation (85) yields
n−1I(Y;K) + ζ(δ, n) ≥ α (86)
where
ζ(δ, n) =
(δ +
√
νn) log2 |Y|+ 4λn − n−1 log2(1−
√
νn)
1− δ −√νn ,
since I(Y;K) ≤ log2 |Y| and H(T ) ≤ log2 |T | ≤ nλn. This proves Equation (69) since limδ→0+,
n→∞
ζ(δ, n) = 0.
B. α ≤ n−1H(K|Z) + ζ(δ, n)
Once again, let (f, ϕ) be a (r, α, κ, δ, n)-TA code for DM-AIC(pY |X , pZ|X). Being a (r, α, κ, δ, n)-TA code
requires that
δ ≥ max
ψ∈P(Y|Z)
Pr
(∑
y
ψ(y|Z)ϕ(M−{M}|y,K) ≥ 2−nα
)
(87)
≥ Pr
∑
y,k,t
p(y|k, t)p(k, t|Z)ϕ(M−{M}|y,K) ≥ 2−nα
 (88)
≥ Pr
 ∑
y:(y,k,t)∈D+
p(y|K,T )p(K,T |Z)ϕ(M−{M}|y,K) ≥ 2−nα
 (89)
=
∑
z,m,k,t
1
{
p(k, t|z)τ(m, k, t) ≥ 2−nα} p(z,m, k, t) (90)
since
∑
k,t pY|K,T (·|k, t)pK,T |Z(k, t|·) ∈ P(Y |Z) and all summands inside the probability term are positive.
Furthermore, from Equation (90), it follows that
δ +
√
νn + 2
−nλn ≥
∑
z,t
1
{
2−H(K|Z,T=t)−3nλnp(t|z)(1−√νn) ≥ 2−nα
}
p(z, t) (91)
since
p(k, t|z) = p(z|k, t)p(k|t)
p(z|t) p(t|z) ≥ 2
−H(K|Z,T=t)−3nλnp(t|z)
for all (z,m, k, t) ∈ D+ implies
1
{
p(k, t|z)τ(m, k, t) ≥ 2−nα} ≥ 1{2−H(K|Z,T=t)−3nλnp(t|z)(1−√νn) ≥ 2−nα}
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− 1 {τ(m, k, t) < 1−√νn} − 1
{
(z,m, k, t) /∈ D+}
and the sum of 1
{
τ(m, k, t) < 1−√νn
}
terms can be bounded using Lemma 20, while the sum of 1 {(z,m, k, t) /∈ D+}
terms is bounded by the fact that Pr ((Z,K,M, T ) /∈ D+) ≤ 2−nλn .
Now, Equation (70) can be proved using basic information inequalities as follows:
H(K|Z) +H(T |Z,K) + 3nλn − log2(1−
√
νn)
=
∑
z,t
[H(K|Z, T = t) + 3nλn − log2 p(t|z)− log2(1−
√
νn)] p(z, t) (92)
≥ nα
∑
z,t
1
{
2−H(K|Z,T=t)−3nλnp(t|z)(1−√νn) < 2−nα
}
p(z, t) (93)
≥ nα(1− δ −√νn − 2−nλn) (94)
where (94) follows from Equation (91). Hence,
n−1H(K|Z) + ζ(δ, n) ≥ α (95)
where
ζ(δ, n) =
(δ +
√
νn + 2
−nλn)κ+ 4λn − n−1 log2(1−
√
νn)
1− δ −√νn − 2−nλn ,
since H(K|Z) ≤ H(K) = nκ and H(T |Z,K) ≤ log2 |T | ≤ nλn. Equation (95) proves Equation (70) since
limδ→0+
n→∞
ζ(δ, n) = 0.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 14
The proof of Theorem 14 is divided into three parts. In Appendix D-A, it will be shown that if positive real
numbers satisfy
r + α ≤ I(Y ;U,W )
2α− κ ≤ I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z;U |W )
α− κ ≤ 0
for some random variables X,U,W such that W c U c X c (Y,Z), then (r, α, κ) ∈ CTA(pY |X , pZ|X). Next,
in Appendix D-B, it will be shown that if (r, α, κ) ∈ CTA(pY |X , pZ|X), then there exists X,U,W such that
W c U c X c (Y,Z) and
r + α ≤ I(Y ;U,W )
2α− κ ≤ I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z;U |W )
α− κ ≤ 0.
Finally, we shall show in Appendix D-C, that restricting auxiliary random variables U and W so that |U| ≤
(|X |+ 1)(|X |+ 2) and |W| ≤ |X |+ 2 does not reduce the established region.
Proof:
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A. Direct for Theorem 14
The set of all positive (r, α, κ) that satisfy
r = r′ − β (96)
α = α′ + β (97)
κ = κ′ + 2β (98)
β < r′ (99)
β ≥ 0 (100)
r′ ≥ 0 (101)
α′ ≥ 0 (102)
κ′ ≥ 0 (103)
r′ + α′ < I(Y ;U,W ) (104)
α′ < I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z;U |W ) (105)
α′ − κ′ < 0 (106)
for some random variables U,W where W c U c X c (Y,Z) and real number r′, α′, κ′, β is achievable by the
combination of Theorem 11 and Theorem 12. Here, (r′, α′, κ′) correspond to the points achievable by Theorem 11,
while r, α, κ, and β correspond to the regions that can be obtained by applying Theorem 12 to Theorem 11.
Applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination to remove r′, α′, κ′ and β from Equations (96)–(106) proves that if
r + α < I(Y ;U,W ) (107)
2α− κ < I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z;U |W ) (108)
α− κ < 0, (109)
then (r, α, κ) ∈ CTA(pY |X , pZ|X).
B. Converse for Theorem 14
In order for (r, α, κ) to be achievable for DM-AIC(pY |X , pZ|X), there must exist a sequence of (rn, αn, κn, δn, n)-
TA codes, for n = {1, 2, . . . }, such that
lim
n→∞ |(rn, αn, κn, δn)− (r, α, κ, 0)| = 0.
But,
rn + αn ≤ n−1I(Y;M,K) + ζ(δn, n) + n−1 + δn log2 |Y| (110)
2αn − κn ≤ n−1 [I(Y;M,K)− I(Z;M,K)] + 2ζ(δn, n) + n−1 + δn log2 |Y| (111)
αn − κn ≤ 0 (112)
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must hold for a given (rn, αn, κn, δn, n)-TA code. Indeed, to prove Equations (110)–(112), first observe the following
inequalities for a (rn, αn, κn, δn, n)-TA code:
rn ≤ n−1I(Y;M |K) + n−1 + δn log2 |Y| (113)
0 ≤ n−1[I(Y;M |K)− I(Z;M |K)] + n−1 + δn log2 |Y| (114)
αn ≤ n−1I(Y;K) + ζ(δn, n) (115)
αn ≤ n−1H(K|Z) + ζ(δn, n) (116)
κ = n−1H(K) (117)
where (113) and (114) are because (from Fano’s inequality and the data processing inequality)
H(M |K) = I(Y;M |K) +H(M |Y,K) ≤ I(Y;M |K) + 1 + nδn log2 |Y|,
and further for (113) because nrn = H(M |K) and for (114) because I(Z;M |K) ≤ H(M |K); next (115) and (116)
are due to Lemma 13; and finally (117) is because K is uniform over {1, . . . , 2nκ}. Equations (110)–(112) can be
derived from linear combinations of (113)–(117).
Now, Equations (110)–(112) also dictate (as we will show in later in the proof) that there exists RVS X,U,W ,
such that W c U c X c (Y,Z), and
rn + αn ≤ I(Y ;U,W ) + ζ(δn, n) + n−1 + δn log2 |Y| (118)
2αn − κn ≤ I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z;U |W ) + 2ζ(δn, n) + n−1 + δn log2 |Y| (119)
αn − κn ≤ 0. (120)
Furthermore, we can take without loss of generality |U| ≤ (|X | + 2)(|X | + 1) and |W| ≤ |X | + 2 as shown
in Appendix D-C. Thus, each triple (r, α, κ) ∈ CT A(pY |X , pZ|X) can be described by a limit point of the set
of (r′, α′, κ′) for which there exist X,U,W , where |U| ≤ (|X | + 2)(|X | + 1) and |W| ≤ |X | + 2, such that
W c U c X c (Y,Z) and
r′ + α′ ≤ I(Y ;U,W ) (121)
2α′ − κ′ ≤ I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z;U |W ) (122)
α′ − κ′ ≤ 0 (123)
since limn→∞ δn = 0 and limn→∞ ζ(δn, n) = 0. But, the set of (r′, α′, κ′) that satisfy Equations (121)–(123)
is a closed set by [21, Theorem 4.15] since the set of all probability mass functions of X,U,W , where |U| ≤
(|X | + 2)(|X | + 1), and |W| ≤ |X | + 2, and W c U c X c (Y,Z), is itself a compact set. Hence, it follows
that if (r, α, κ) ∈ CT A(pY |X , pZ|X), then there exists X,U,W , where |U| ≤ (|X |+2)(|X |+1) and |W| ≤ |X |+1,
such that W c U c X c (Y,Z) and
r + α ≤ I(Y ;U,W ) (124)
2α− κ ≤ I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z;U |W ) (125)
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α− κ ≤ 0. (126)
We now return to proving Equations (118)–(120). This can be done via a trick from the proof of [19, Lemma 15.7],
in which for Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) and Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) it is shown that
n−1[I(Y;M,K)− I(Z;M,K)] = n−1[I(Y1;M,K|Zn2 )− I(Z1;M,K|Zn2 )]
+ n−1
n∑
i=2
[I(Y n2 ;M,K|Y1)− I(Zn2 ;M,K|Y1)] (127)
=
n∑
i=1
n−1[I(Yi;M,K|Y i−11 , Zni+1)− I(Zi;M,K|Y i−11 , Zni+1)] (128)
= I(YJ ;M,K|W )− I(ZJ ;M,K|W ) (129)
where J is uniformly distributed over {1, . . . , n}, and W , (Y J−11 , ZnJ+1, J). Now, clearly,
(W,M,K) c XJ c YJ ,
pYJ |XJ = pY |X , and
n−1I(Y;M,K) =
n∑
i=1
n−1I(Yi;M,K|Y i−11 ) ≤
n∑
i=1
n−1I(Yi;M,K, Y i−11 , Z
n
i+1) = I(YJ ;M,K,W |J) (130)
≤ I(YJ ;M,K,W ). (131)
Combining Equations (129) and (131) with Equations (110)–(112) and setting U = (W,M,K) yields (118)–(120).
C. Auxiliary random variable cardinalities
Finally, we now return to prove that |U| ≤ (|X | + 2)(|X | + 1) and |W| ≤ |X | + 2 in Equations (118)–
(120). This can be done via the Fenchel–Eggleston–Carathe´odory theorem (see, for example, [22, Appendix A]
or [19, Lemma 15.6]). For completeness, we will prove the bounds using a restricted version of a support lemma
from [22, Appendix C]. Note, we enter here a restricted version of the lemma, because the general U and W from
Equations (118)–(120) has a finite support set, and thus we have no need to discuss continuous distributions or
differential entropy.
Lemma 21. ([22, Appendix C]) Let X and U be finite sets. Let Q be a connected compact subset of pmfs of
X and pX|U=u ∈ Q for each u ∈ U . Suppose that gj(pi), j = 1, . . . , d, are real valued continuous functions of
pi ∈ Q. Then for every U ∼ pU (u) defined on U , there exists a random variable U ′ ∼ pU ′(u′) with |U ′| ≤ d and
pX|U ′=u′ ∈ Q, for each u′ ∈ U ′, such that for j = 1, . . . , d,∑
u∈U
gj(pX|U=u)pU (u) =
∑
u′∈U ′
gj(pX|U ′=u′)pU ′(u′).
With Lemma 21, the goal is to find U ′ and W ′ such that |U ′| ≤ (|X |+ 1)(|X |+ 2) and |W ′| ≤ |X |+ 2, as well
as W ′ c U ′ c X c (Y, Z) and
I(Y ;U,W ) = I(Y ;U ′,W ′) (132)
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I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z;U |W ) = I(Y ;U ′|W ′)− I(Z;U ′|W ′). (133)
Doing so shows that we may restrict the cardinalities of U and W .
First, to replace W ∼ pW (w) with W ′ ∼ pW ′(w), observe that p(x) (for each x), H(Y |W ), I(Y ;U |W ), and
I(Z;U |W ) can be written as
p(x) =
∑
w∈W
p(x|w)pW (w), ∀x ∈ X (134)
H(Y |W ) =
∑
w∈W
H(Y |W = w)pW (w) (135)
I(Y ;U |W ) =
∑
w∈W
I(Y ;U |W = w)pW (w) (136)
I(Z;U |W ) =
∑
w∈W
I(Z;U |W = w)pW (w) (137)
and that p(x|w) (for each x), H(Y |W = w), I(Y ;U |W = w), and I(Z;U |W = w) are each a continuous function
of distribution pU |W=w. Thus, there exists a W ′ and W ′ such that |W|′ ≤ |X | + 2 (note that fixing p(x) for
x ∈ {1, . . . , |X | − 1} also fixes p(|X |)) and∑
w∈W
p(x|w)pW (w) =
∑
w′∈W′
p(x|w′)pW ′(w′), ∀x ∈ X (138)
H(Y |W ) = H(Y |W ′) (139)
I(Y ;U |W ) = I(Y ;U ′|W ′) (140)
I(Z;U |W ) = I(Z;U ′|W ′), (141)
where U ′|{W ′ = w′} is U |{W = w′}, by Lemma 21. Furthermore,
I(Y ;U,W ) = I(Y ;U |W ) +H(Y )−H(Y |W ) = I(Y ;U ′,W ′) (142)
by Equations6 (138)–(140) while
I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z;U |W ) = I(Y ;U ′|W ′)− I(Z;U ′|W ′) (143)
by Equations (140) and (141). Equations (142) and (143) demonstrate that we may assume that |W| ≤ |X |+ 2 in
Equations (132) and (133).
So, let us assume that |W| ≤ |X |+ 2, but that U is arbitrary. This time, in order to replace U , where U |{W =
w} ∼ ddupU |W=w, with U ′ where U ′|{W = w} ∼ pU ′|W (u|w), observe that we only need to conserve p(x|w) (for
each x ∈ {1, . . . , |X | − 1} and w), H(Y |U,W = w) (for each w), and H(Z|U,W = w) (for each w). To this end,
as before, each of these (|X |+ 1)|W| equations can be written as the average of a continuous function of pX|U=u.
Therefore, there exists a U ′ and U ′, where |U ′| ≤ (|X |+ 1)|W| ≤ (|X |+ 1)(|X |+ 2), such that
I(Y ;U,W ) = I(Y ;U ′,W ) (144)
6Equation (138) implies that H(Y ) remains unchanged when attaching W or W ′.
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and
I(Y ;U |W )− I(Z;U |W ) = I(Y ;U ′|W )− I(Z;U ′|W ) (145)
by Lemma 21.
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